Using complaints as a measure of quality, the quality of homeowners insurance policies offered to high versus low minority areas is compared. The results indicate that homeowners insurance policies offered to high minority areas have a lower quality than policies offered to low minority areas. One should, however, be aware that estimation bias due to omitted variables and measurement errors is always a possibility in empirical works relying on natural experiments like this one.
INTRODUCTION
Has there been unfair racial discrimination in the homeowners insurance markets? Few issues in insurance carry pragmatic and theoretical ramifications as serious as this one. An assertive answer may have grave legal consequence for insurers. Racial discrimination in homeowners insurance may aggravate the decay of the minority neighborhoods because a lack of insurance may restrict their ability to rebuild their houses after major damage. The existence of racial discrimination also appears to contradict the implications of Becker's 1957 seminal work on the economics of discrimination which suggests competition should hold discriminatory activities to a minimal level, yet it is frequently suggested that the property-liability insurance markets are highly competitive.
Heretofore, the literature has examined two facets of this issue: Are prices charged to minorities excessive? Do minorities have equal access to insurance coverage? The usual approach to the former question has been testing the correlation between minority presence and loss ratio by multivariate regressions (see, for example, Harrington and Niehaus 1998; and Sider 1996) . On the latter question, the literature has tracked whether there is an equal agent/agency presence and insurance market penetration rate in high versus low minority areas, and whether minorities are being denied insurance coverage because of racial prejudice (see, for example, Squires, Velez, and Taeuber 1991; AlFaris 1994; and Schultz 1995) .
An important aspect has been largely neglected by the literature. Pauly, Kunreuther, and Kleindorfer (1986) , for example, suggest that insurers adjusted the quality margin when their ability to control premiums was constrained by rate regulation. Since unfair racial discrimination is illegal, it is more likely to be accomplished through a less lucid margin --the quality margin. Premiums and losses are well documented and closely monitored by regulators, competitors, consumers, and company management as well. Quality, on the other hand, is difficult to measure or compare. This study intends to fill that void by investigating whether there is a quality difference between insurance products sold to high versus low minority areas.
THE MEASURE OF QUALITY
A major problem with studies of product quality is the availability of a quality measure. In this study, complaint frequency is used as an indicator of quality. For some time, complaint indexes (usually the company complaint to premium ratio divided by the industry complaint to premium ratio) by lines of business have been published by many insurance regulators with the implicit understanding that they be used as a quality indicator. Doerpinhaus (1994) first explicitly used the complaint data as a quality indicator to investigate the variations in service quality across auto insurers. Subsequently, complaint data was used to compare the service quality differential between direct writers and agency writers in Barrese, Doerpinhaus, and Nelson (1995) . The rationale for using complaint data as a measure of service quality has been discussed in the above studies. Below are some arguments concerning this rationale.
Complaints reflect service quality to the extent that consumers make complaints when the quality or quantity of service delivered by the insurers falls short of certain levels of their expectations. Though expectations can be subjective, to a large extent they are affected by how well insurers explain their products to customers; this is also part of the service provided by insurers. It was further argued in Doerpinhaus (1994) , citing De Vany and Saving (1983) , that the full price of an insurance policy should include both the premium as well as the consumer's expected cost of making complaints.
DATA
Data used in this study includes insurance data from the Missouri Department of Insurance (MDI), demographic data from the 1990 census, and imprisonment data from the Missouri Department of Corrections. The insurance data are the zip code aggregates of premium, exposure, loss count, and loss frequency in homeowners multi-peril and dwelling fire from 1988 to 1995. An exposure is defined as one year of coverage per housing unit. These are written exposure counts, written premiums, and paid loss counts. Companies which have written less than 500 annual exposures in homeowners insurance policies in Missouri are excluded, because they are not required to file their zip code data to the MDI. The underwriting and complaint data of the residual market underwriter (Fair Access to Insurance Requirements Plan) are also excluded. The complaint data is the zip code aggregates of complaints on homeowners multiperil and dwelling fire policies received by the MDI from 1988 through 1995 which were closed by March 1997.
Complaints not yet closed are excluded because they are not public information. Also excluded are complaints on out of state companies and companies which did not file their underwriting experience with the MDI. The excluded complaints represent ten percent of all complaints on homeowners insurance from 1988 through 1995.
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Whereas previous studies used all complaints as a quality indicator, this paper uses two complaint counts: total complaints and complaints which lead to concessions by insurers. For the convenience of exposition, the latter will be referred to as valid complaints. We stress that this is simply for the convenience of exposition. Complaints that do not lead to concessions may still be valid. At the very least, they reflect the dissatisfaction of some consumers. Customers who are generally satisfied are less likely to file a complaint in the case of a dispute. Mere dissatisfaction, however, may be a result of subjective expectations or perceptions independent of the explanations provided by insurance agents. Therefore, the latter measure is employed to reinforce the objective ground of the complaint measure and to test the robustness of the results.
Further, we exclude complaints about discrimination, premium increase, and refusal to write from the following analyses to minimize the controversial components of the complaint data as a quality signal. The discrimination category includes all complaints about unfair discrimination such as redlining. We believe that these complaints can also be quality indicators, especially if they are valid. A valid complaint strongly suggests mistakes were made in the process of servicing or selling insurance products.
What are most of the complaints about and how do they distribute? Table 1 lists the number of complaints by reason. The bulk of the complaints are claims related. However, the number of the complaints caused by claims is difficult to determine because a substantial portion of the complaints in certain categories such as cancellation, nonrenewal, or premium increase are likely to be caused by claims, too. After excluding complaints about discrimination, refusal to write, and premium increase, table 2 presents the distribution of zip codes by complaint frequency between 1993 and 1995. Observe that the zip code distribution of complaints is highly skewed. More than half of the zip codes have no complaints in the sample period. Table 3 further presents the number of complaints per thousand exposures between 1993 and 1995 for zip codes grouped by their race composition (minority to total population ratio). It indicates a strong and positive association between complaint frequency and race composition. On average, for every 10,000 exposures, there were 3.09 complaints; 0.94 of those are valid complaints. Both the total and valid complaint frequencies are clearly higher in high minority zip codes than statewide. Could this positive relationship between race and complaint frequency be caused by the correlation of the minority variable with other factors which affect the quality of insurance products? In the next section, we use multivariate statistical analyses to try to disentangle the effects of a few possible confounding factors from the minority variable. 
REGRESSION ANALYSES

Estimator
The integer property of the complaint data suggests that count data models are appropriate for the analyses of the complaint data. A commonly used count data model is Poisson regression. Assume that the number of complaints (or valid complaints) in zip code i between 1993 and 1995 is y i . The Poisson regression assumes that:
where λ i is the mean of the dependent variable (the number of complaints) conditional on a group of independent variables x i , and β is the vector of coefficients for the exogenous variables to be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. The Poisson regression also assumes that the conditional mean equals the conditional variance of the dependent variable. In practice, omitting important explanatory variables can cause the conditional variance of the dependent variable to exceed its conditional mean. This so-called over-dispersion problem can lead to inefficient estimation and biased inference. The t-tests suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (1986) are used to test for overdispersion. For the total complaint but not the valid complaint equation, the results of these tests reject the assumption that conditional variance equals conditional mean at the 0.01 level of significance. A common solution to the overdispersion problem is to use the negative binomial regression which allows the conditional variance of the dependent variable to differ from its conditional mean by introducing a random error into equation (2), as follows:
where exp(ε) has a gamma distribution (Cameron and Trivedi 1986) . The negative binomial regression is the NEGBIN II model in Cameron and Trivedi (1986) .
Independent Variables
The independent and dependent variables and their definitions are provided in Table 4 . Provided that other things are equal, the expected number of complaints (λ i ) is expected to have a positive linear relationship with the number of exposures. Hence, the natural log of written exposure is included. In addition, the coefficient of the natural log of written exposure is constrained to one. Percentage of the population living in Census designated areas with population more than 2,500 (1990 Census). Note that a city can have several Census designated areas.
Service Quality and Unfair Racial Discrimination
Crime Rate Number of violence and property crimes leading to imprisonments by zip code residents/Total population (1984 -1995) .
Losses, including frequency and severity, can affect complaints in two ways. First, loss frequency, and perhaps also severity, increases the amount of service and therefore the chance of human errors. Second, both frequency and severity may change insurers' ex post perception of the desirability of the policy holder and therefore the quality of the service provided to the policy holder. Note that it is not unusual for a company to cancel a policy because of a claim(s). Since these effects of losses are ex post effects, the random component of losses will not cause the statistical inference to be biased.
Low income consumers may be less sensitive to the quality and more sensitive to the price than high income consumers. Well-educated customers may be more effective shoppers. They may also have better communication with insurance companies. In addition, education may actually be a more accurate indicator of the expected permanent income of an individual than current income. The urban variable is included because it may be more costly to deliver service to rural-area consumers due to a higher transportation cost.
High crime rates have been cited by some retailers as the reason for refusing to serve certain areas. Proving the validity of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper. Does the neighborhood crime rate play a role in the supply of quality in homeowners insurance? We decided to include a crime variable to explore this issue. A direct crime statistic is not available. Instead, the ratio of the number of violence and property crimes, 3 leading to imprisonment, committed by residents of each zip code from 1984 through 1995 to the zip code population is used as a proxy for the crime rate. Since the Department of Corrections updates the addresses of repeat offenders, the addresses used for aggregating their zip code imprisonment data are the addresses of the prisoners during the latest imprisonment. Conversations with criminal justice professors suggest that repeat offenders are likely to move to areas of the same socioeconomic characteristics and so this should not cause significant distortion to the data. The imprisonment rate is only an imperfect substitute for a direct crime statistic, because crimes do not always lead to imprisonment. However, direct crime statistics reported by police reporting units are even less satisfactory because they are incomplete (voluntary reporting) and not by zip code or county.
The crime rate may also partially control for the possible effects of insurance fraud. Insurers may be more stringent in claim settlements when fraud rates in the area are higher than average. This may irritate some consumers. If the irritated consumers are willing to file complaints with a lower chance of success, fraud may then indirectly cause the complaint frequency to increase. If the fraud problem is related to demographic variables such as income and which are related to the minority variable, failing to control for the fraud problem may bias the results of this study.
The minority percentage is included to measure whether high minority zip codes receive a different quality of service than other zip codes. If it has a positive/negative coefficient, it suggests insurers have provided a lower/higher service quality to high minority areas.
Results
Results for the negative binomial regressions are reported in Table 4 . The statistical significance, magnitude, and signs of the minority variable are similar using either Poisson or negative binomial regressions. The minority variable is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in both the total and valid complaint equations. The marginal effects are computed at the means of the independent variables. The conditional means at this sample point are 0.244 for total complaints and 0.0669 for valid complaints. The minority coefficients suggest that increasing the minority concentration from 0 to 100 percent increases the expected number of complaints by about 93 percent and the expected number of valid complaints by about 157 percent. This is a strong effect. However, the exact quantitative correspondence between the level of quality and the number of complaints is an issue that cannot be addressed in this paper. This result only suggests a potentially important relationship between minority presence and service quality. The means (standard deviations) of the independent variables, the number of all complaints and the number of valid complaints, are 3.09 and 1.01 (6.56 and 2.29) respectively. The means and standard deviations reported here are not weighted. The units of loss severity and income are both $10,000. b.
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Regressions used the data of 977 zip codes. There are a total of 995 zip codes with a population more than zero in the 1990 Census data. Eighteen of these zip codes do not have losses from 1993 through 1995 and therefore loss severity is not defined for these zip codes. These are mostly small zip codes with a combined population of 8156. c.
Because only 25 out of the 995 zip codes have a more than 50 percent minority population and because these high minority zip codes also tend to have high complaint ratios, influential observations become a serious concern for the regressions. To address this problem, the above regressions are repeated with each one of the 25 high minority zip codes excluded each time. The results indicate that excluding any one of the 25 high minority zip codes will not have a significant effect on either the sign or the statistical significance of the minority variable.
Loss frequency and severity clearly have a major effect on complaint frequency. Increasing the loss frequency by 10 percent increases the number of complaints by 0.13 and the number of valid complaints by 0.037. Increasing the loss severity by $1000 increases the number of complaints by 0.026 and the number of valid complaints by 0.0074.
The percentage of people with a bachelor, graduate, or professional degree is highly significant and negative as expected, whereas the crime and median household income variables are both insignificant at the ninety percent confidence level. The income variable is significant and negative when the education variable is excluded. One possible explanation is that education is indeed a better indicator of the expected permanent income than current income. The crime rate is also insignificant in almost all of the robustness checks presented below. Whether the crime variable should be included or not is controversial; including the crime variable does not have a significant effect on the results of regressions, however. The sign of the urban variable is unexpected. Nonetheless, the percentage of people residing in urban areas is marginally significant in the valid complaint equation only.
Robustness
The robustness of the results is tested by alternative sample period, explanatory variables, and models. The results of robustness checks are presented in Table 6 . Presented on top of the table are the results of weighted least square regressions using either the complaint to exposure ratio or the claim-related complaint to loss count ratio as dependent variables.
4 When the dependent variable is the ratio of complaints to exposures, the independent variables are the same as those used in the negative binomial regressions except that the log exposure variable is excluded. When the dependent variable is the claim-related complaint to loss count ratio (the number of complaints on claim denial, claim delay, and unsatisfactory settlements divided by the number of losses), loss frequency and log exposure are both excluded from the independent variables. 4 The weight used is the square root of the number of exposures. Assume all policy holders in a zip code are identical. Each one of them purchases one policy year of coverage and files either one or no complaints; and the probability for a policy holder to file a complaint is p. By the central limit theorem, the standard deviation of the complaint to exposure ratio in the zip code will be p p ( ) 1 − divided by the square root of the number of exposures. Hence, the square root of the number of exposures is chosen as the weight for the OLS regression to try to control for heteroskedasticity. The next row reports the results of including the ratio of valid to total complaints from 1988 through 1992 into the list of independent variables. This variable is included to capture the propensity for consumers in a zip code to make complaints, or consumers' willingness to file complaints even when the chance of sucess is relatively low. This high propensity to complain can be caused by many factors including fraud, consumer prejudice against insurance companies, and consumers receiving inferior services as well. Fraud problems can cause insurers to be more stringent on certain groups of consumers. Widespread public perception of racial discrimination may cause minority consumers to be more suspicious and more likely to complain about the insurers.
To avoid endogeneity problems, past valid to total complaint ratio is used instead of the current ratio. One of the problems with including this variable is that because many zip codes have no complaints from 1988 through 1992, the valid to total complaint ratio is missing. Therefore, including this variable limits the sample size to only 388 observations. The stochastic nature of the complaint data may also cause errors in the independent variable. Nonetheless, the fact that including this variable has minimal effect on the coefficient of the minority variable suggests that more elaborate effort in this direction is not promising.
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The following rows of Table 6 report the coefficients of the minority variable when the percentage of population below poverty level, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households which are family households, the percentage of policies which are HO-8 policies (Coverages on properties which have a replacement value much higher than its market value), and the percentage of policies which are basic coverage policies 6 are separately included into the negative binomial regression as independent variables. Beneath these robustness checks, the minority coefficients when replacing the urban variable by the percentage of population residing in Census designated areas with over 10,000 population, when replacing median household income by per capita income, and when third-party complaints are excluded are reported. The minority coefficients found in the negative binomial regression using claim-related complaints as the dependent variables and using the zip code aggregates of eight years (1988 through 1995) of underwriting and complaint data are reported at the bottom of Table 6 .
The minority variable is statistically significant at the ninety-eight percent confidence level in all cases. The valid to total complaint ratio is insignificant when included as an independent variable. It is also insignificant when included in other robustness checks regressions. The results for the crime rate and the valid to total complaint ratio do not support the hypothesis that fraud or consumer prejudice against insurers can have a major 5 Alternatively, we performed a regression of the valid to total complaint ratio on the minority percentage variables to see if minorities have a higher propensity to make complaints. The minority coefficient turns out to be insignificant. It remains insignificant even when other independent variables such as income or urban percentage are included. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that minorities have a higher propensity to make complaints. 6 The MDI requires Missouri insurers to report their number of exposures for basic homeowners coverage policies such as ISO homeowners forms 1, 2, 3, and 5. It is not possible to separate HO-1 and HO-2 policies from this group. Conversations with homeowners rate filing specialist in MDI suggest that HO-1 and HO-2 policies have been gradually phased out in the 1990s. The vast majority of the policies between 1993 and 1995 should be HO-3 and HO-5 policies. While a small number of HO-2 policies are still being written during 1993 and 1995, HO-1 policies are largely extinct during that period of time.
effect on complaint frequency. Of course, these are all imperfect controls for the possible effects of fraud or prejudice on the part of consumers.
CONCLUSIONS
This article argues that if there is unfair racial discrimination in homeowners' insurance markets, it is more likely to be done through the quality margin than the price margin because the former is a less lucid measure. Using complaints as a measure of quality, the quality of homeowners insurance policies offered to high versus low minority areas is compared. After controlling for several factors that can potentially affect the demand and supply for service quality, the results indicate that homeowners insurance policies provided to high minority areas have a lower quality than policies provided to low minority areas.
Like most social science studies relying on natural experiments, in spite of extensive robustness checks, issues such as omission of demand or supply side variables or measurement errors can all possibly bias the results of this study. Micro level data, such as survey or audit data 7 , appears more promising in circumventing these problems. These issues aside, this study should at least serve to point out that quality is an important aspect deserving more attention in future studies on racial discrimination problems in the homeowners insurance markets.
